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POINT I 
THE ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF PETITIONERS' AMENDED 
PETITION DATED DECEMBER l, 1975 WAS NOT A FINAL ORDER FROM 
WHICH APPEAL COULD BE TAKEN. 
The order of partial dismissal of petitioner's amended 
petition dated December 1, 1975, granted in part and denied 
in part a motion to dismiss petitioner's amended petition 
with regard to a petition comprised of seven (7) counts for 
relief, four (4) under conduct and three (3) under condition 
alleged to be seriously detrimental to the child. 
This Court observed In Re Fullmer 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 
P. 2d 343 (1965) with regard to a complaint comprised of 8 
causes of action wherein the Court dismissed the first cause 
of action and denied a motion to dismiss with regard to counts 
2 through 8, from which partial judgment of dismissal the 
appeal was taken, with both parties treating it as an appeal 
from a final judgment, as follows: 
It is from the foregoing judgment that defendant 
appeals. Although treated as such by both parties, 
this is not a final judgment from which an appeal 
may be taken. 
The instant case might well have been entertained 
as an appeal from an interlocutory order or decision. 
However, defendant, did not see fit to follow that 
procedure. 
A case cannot be brought to this Court in 
fragments, and this appeal, not being from a final 
judgment, must be dismissed. 
Therefore, since the order of December 1, 1975 dis-
missed only three (3) of seven (7) counts for relief and 
2 
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the Court denied the motion to dismiss with regard to the 
remaining four (4) counts, the order of partial dismissal 
was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPmmENT Is 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE REMAINDER IJF PETITIONER'S AMENDED 
PETITION BEFORE THE CLOSE OF PETITIONER'S CASE IN CHIEF. 
A. THE CHILD l:l..AS A RIGHT TO A 110RY..AL LIFE A:m 
EVIDE:iCE BEARING ON THAT RIGHT SHOULD HA VE BEE~l 
P?,ESE:TTED r:l FULL TO THE COURT BEFORE IT GRA:~TED A 
MOTION TO DIS~ISS. 
Dr. Cutler testified that the natural father was 
functioning in the adult dull normal range but that in 
school oriented areas, the areas which . 
learnings from school and the vocabulary and 
knowledse function, a general range of knowledge, 
he's functioning at about 75 IO, which is 
borderline mental ~efective. (P. 146 L. 31-34 
and P. 147 L. 1-3.) 
In addition, Dr. Cutler stated that the father of 
the child has an extreme amount of misinformation and 
lack of inforr:lation even for the relatively low level 
of function as follows: ... 
He thinks the canital ofltaly is Spain (P. 147 L. 11-12.) 
Dr. Cutler testified that in addition to the 
intelligence level l')roble!!'I., that the father has what 
is ca~led a characterological tryve of disorder, the 
3 
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basic motivation to such being hostility. lie testified t~t 
characterological hostility is acted out in amoral and 
asocial behavior stating that people with this 
characterological disorder don't see that what they 
do as wrong. ( See P. 148, L. 24-29) 
Dr. Cutler stated that the natural father had 
a very high lie score. (See P. 149, L. 21-32) 
The doctor stated that the child as tested had 
an IQ of 105 and already showed signs of deterioration 
in function. 
When asked about what effect the home situation 
would be on the child with regard to its learning 
and development if it were to reside in a home where 
the step-mother was functioning within the mental 
defective range with a full scale IO of 67 and the 
father functioning in general range of knowled8e at 75 
IQ, which is borderline mental defective, and where 
the child would be residin8 with five children of the 
step-mother from two previous marriages, all of whom 
have had problems with education at one time or another 
and been in special education classes would this composite 
Picture have a detrimental effect on the learning and 
development of the child, Dr. Cutler observed as follows: 
"I can very definitely say more so than just 
the father's structure alone, the mother being 
mentally defective and the mentallv retarded 
children, the total innut is even more restricted 
b~cause the mother is going to have more to do 
with the child than the father. Usuallv the 
father is out working and this could lead to 
severe deprivation I think psychologically and 
4 
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intellectually." (P. 162 L. 31-33 and P. 163 L. 1-5.) 
When the doctor was asked if in his opinion with 
the father being significantly lower in intelligence 
than the child whether it was more probable than not that 
the child would not develop to his Potential if custody 
were to remain with the father, the doctor answered as 
follows: 
That is certainly my oPinion. (See P. 165, L.2) 
And when the doctor was asked as follows: 
Would it be vour oninion that with the father's 
present wife and- five children from two previous 
marriages who are significantly lower in intelligence 
than the child, that it would be more probable than 
not that the child would not develop to his 
potential if he were to continue to reside with the 
mother and these five siblings? 
The doctor answered as follows: 
Very much so I would say. (See P. 165, L. 9) 
Eased on the testimony of an independent psychologist 
who was asked to examine the step-mother at the request of 
counsel for the father, Virgil W. Brockbank, in his 
report, observed as follows: 
The issue of course in terms of her intelligence 
would be: can she orovide the adeCTuate stimulation 
as well as adeauate care for this child of normal 
intelligence? 'rt is unlikely that the combination 
of this mother and father would be sufficient to 
Drovide the bov with the skills most necessarv to 
his adenuate a3~ustment in life . . . The bov will 
undoubted1v sut~er some decrement in intellectual 
tunctionins trorn the lack of stimulation with these 
2arents /:r:rnphasis aded.] 
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The Court did not, on any occasion, either during 
the numerous hearings or during the trial itself have 
an opportunity to see either the father or the step-
mother as they did not appear. Neither of these 
persons testified in Court and the Court had no 
opportunity to observe their demeanor or f,eneral attitude. 
Based on the type of strong evidence heretofore 
set forth, the attorney for the child, Michael Stead, 
desired further and more detailed evidence and this 
evidence would have come out on the second day of trial 
if the Court had not granted the Motion to Dismiss. 
B. THE PLAIN ~rnG OF RULE 23 OF THE UTAH 
JUVENILE COURT RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDL'RE, WHICH 
IMPLEMENTED THE mTENT OF 55-10-84, NOW 78-3a-25 L'. c .A . 
.A..T\lNOTATED AS AMENDED DICTATES THAT ONCE A CASE HAS 
GONE TO TRIAL THE PETITION SHALL NOT BE DISt~ISSED 
UNTIL THE CLOSE OF THE PETITIONER'S CASE. 
Rule 23 of the Utah Juvenile Court Rules of 
Practice and Procedures reads as follows: 
The Court may at any time during, or at the 
conclusion of any hearing, dismiss a petition and 
terminate the proceedings related to the child if 
such action is in the interest of ·ustice and the 
we are o t e c 1 an t e Court s a <lismiss anv 
Petition which has not been oroven. [ Emnhas is added · 
6 
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The above rule provides that while the Court may 
dismiss an action during or at the conclusion of any 
hearing, it may not dismiss a petition until the 
?etitioner has an opportunity to prove his case. This 
cannot be done until the close of petitioner's case 
and this is the sensible and plain meaninF, of the 
statute. 
Anything less would be incompatible with the 
plain meaning of the foregoing rule for the following 
reasons: 
1. First, a dismissal during the trial itself 
would not be a dismissal "during or at the conclusion 
of a hearing", as the same denotes something less 
than a motion in mid-trial, such as a Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Once the matter has gone to trial, a Motion 
to Dismiss should not be granted until petitioner has 
completed his case in chief and has not proven his case. 
2. Second, to dismiss a case where the Court has 
alreadv denied an identical motion for the reason that, 
as stated by the Court, "'~r. Goodwill had not rested," 
(f'. 179 L. 7-9) would not be in the "interest of justice" 
7 j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
within the meaning of the rule as that phrase dictates 
that petitioners have their day in Court. 
3. Third, such an action could not be in the 
"welfare of the child" within the meaning of the fore-
going rule, for a decision was made in this case without 
the Court even once seeing or hearing from the natural 
father or step-mother, and without receiving testimony 
from Dr. Victor B. Cline, the psychologist the Court 
ordered to examine the child and who made the observation 
with regard to the threatened castration by the step-~other. 
C. THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE WHICH LMPLEME~-l"TED 
THE STATUTE IN OUESTION WOULD ACCORD A PETITIONER THE 
SAME TREATMENT OF FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY PETITIONER 
WOULD RECEIVE IF THE CASE HAD BEEN HEARD IN DISTRICT 
COURT. 
If the case had been heard in District Court and 
the District Court at the time for hearing the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus had not certified the question to the 
Juvenile Court the Rules of Civil Procedure would 
undoubtedly have prevailed. 
Rule 4l(b) U.R.C.P. provides: 
After the plaintiff has completed the Presenta-
tion of his evidence, the defendant, witho~t waiving 
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion 
is not granted, may move for a disnissal on the 
ground that upon the facts and the law the nlaintiff 
has shown no right to relief. 
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Even if this Court determines that Rule 4-1 (b), 
U.R.C.P. does not apply specifically to the foregoing 
issue, it is submitted that the purpose of Rule 23 
implementing the foregoing statute is in confon:lity 
with the spirit and meaning of Rule 4l(b) and therefore 
the Motion to Dismiss prior to the close of Petitioner's 
case was premature and the order based thereon should 
be vacated and set aside. 
D. TO INTERPR.f.T THE STATUTE AS !~ARR.OWLY AS L'RGED 
BY COillISEL FOR RESPONDENT WOULD BE A DE~HAL OF THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article 1 Section 7 of the Due Process Clause of 
the Utah constitution provides as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
In Jensen v. Union Pacific ~· Co, 6 U. 2d 253, 
21 P. 994, (1889), it is observed as follows: 
Manv definitions have been attmepted, but it 
is believed that they all come to this citation, 
which means that a party shall have his day in 
Court, --trial; which Tieans the right of each 
party, plaintiff and defendant, to introduce 
evidence to establish his right to recover on 
the one hand, and to establish his defense 
upon the part of the other; after which comes 
judgment.· Any judgment which is rendered 
without these modes of procedure, or in 2isregard 
of them, is not "due process of law." Any 
other procedure condemns before it hears, does not 
proceed upon in~uirv, but renders judgment before 
trial. 
9 
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In Christiansen~· Harris, 109 Q. l, 163 P. 2d 
314, (1945), it is observed as follows: 
apparently 
If Rule 23, which was passed to implement 55-10-84, 
now 78-3a-25 U.C.A. annotated as amended, were construed 
to mean that a petition could be discissed at any time 
and under any circumstances without regard to the rights 
of a petitioner who has spent considerable time and money 
paying for Court ordered psychological examinations and 
for expert witnesses to appear and prepare to appear in 
trial, and to specifically permit the Court to dismiss 
a petition before the close of petitioner's case and over 
the objection of independent counsel for the child, then 
the statute and the rule in question are void as being a 
denial of due process within the meaning of Article 1 
Section 7 of the Utah constitution. 
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The minor child's right to a normal life and to 
develop normally would likewise be frustrated by such 
a narrow construction of the foregoing Rule. If Rule 
23 as it implements 55-10-84, now 73-3a-25 U.C.A. 
annotated as amended, were construed to mean that once 
justiciable issues of fact are raised with regard to 
the rights of a minor child and the petition which 
gives rise to such issues has survived a Motion to 
Dismiss and the case has proceeded to trial that the 
Court can dismiss the petition without giving petitioner 
the full right to be heard and to introduce evidence to 
establish his cause in his case in chief, said rule and 
statute would be void within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT III 
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FILED IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DIS'I'RICT COURT RESULTED PT AN ORDER CERTIFYING THE CASE TO 
THE JUVEtnLE COURT WITH DIRECTIONS THAT IT MAKE FINDINGS 
A:ID AN ORDER WITH P.EGARD TO CUSTODY ~TD REFER THE MATTER 
BACK TO DISTRICT COURT FOR FINAL HEARING ON THE WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
Following the death of the naternal grandmother, 
temporary custodian of the child and joint petitioner 
herein, the Juvenile Court, on April 1, 1975, entered 
an order providing for temporary custody and guardianship 
in the natural father subject to the protective supervision 
of t~e ~ivision of Family Services as follows: 
11 
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I~ IS ORDERED THATTHf. ABOVE-NAMED CHILD BE 
RETT'RNED TO THE TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND GUARDIA;JSHIP 
OF THE FATHER, SUBJECT TO THE PRO!ECTIVE SUPERVISIOti 
OF THE DIVISION OF FAMILY S":RVICES, PE:'1DING TRIAL 
OF THE ABOVE MATTER, AND THE DIVISION OF FAMILY 
SERVICES IS DIRECTED TO EFFECT THE TRANSFER OF THE 
ABOVE-~1AMED CHILD FROM THE AUNT, JANET STO\.JELL, TO 
THE FATHER, AFOREMENTIONED, WITHIN 24 HOURS HEREOF. 
Dated this 1st day of April 1975. 
BY THE COURT: 
/SI John Farr Larson 
JUDGE 
The child had never been in the legal custody of 
the father. In the divorce action custody was awarded to 
the child's mother. After the death of the child's mother, 
the Juvenile Court awarded temporary custody to the joint 
petitioner, the child's maternal grandmother, and following 
the death of the maternal grandmother the Juvenile Court 
placed temporary custody of the child with the natural 
father. 
On March 21, 1975, a hearing on the father's Writ 
of Habeas Corpus was held in the District Court resulting 
in an order which directed the Juvenile Court, among 
other things, as follows: 
1. The question of the custody of the minor child, 
Douglas Rex Izatt, is certified to the District 
Juvenile Court in and for Salt Lake Countv for 
determination pursuant to 55-10-78 C.C.A. as 
amended. 
12 
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2. That the Writ of Habeas Corpus herein is 
continued without date. 
3. That follm1ing the hearing in Juvenile 
Court, the Juvenile Court shall ~ake findings and 
an order with re ard to custody and refer the matter 
e Di rict ourt . or a ina earina on e 
Writ of Habeas Corpus ... [Emphasis added. 
The statute under which the District Court proceeded 
to make its ruling on the Writ of Habeas Corpus is clear 
and unambiguous in scope wherein it is observed in 78-3a-17, 
formerly 55-10-73, U.C.A. annotated as follows: 
~Tothing contained in this act shall deprive 
the District Courts of jurisdiction to appoint a 
~uardian for a child nor of jurisdiction to deter-
mine the custody of the child upon Writ of Habeas 
Corpus when the question of custody is incidental 
to the determination of a cause in the District 
Court; provided that in case a petition involving 
the same child is endin in the Juvenile Court or 
t e Juveni e Court s previous y acquire continu-
ing jurisdiction over the same child, the District 
Court shall certify the question of custody to the 
Juvenile Court for determination. 
A District Court may at any time decline to 
pass upon a question of custody and may certify 
that uestion to the Juvenile Court for a determin-
ation or recommen ation. Emp 
The Juvenile Court by refusing to act and by doing 
nothing more than dismissing petitioner's petition, in 
effect, left the child in limbo with no permanent order 
as to who should have the permanent legal custody of the 
child. On the date the Court entered its order of dismissal 
there was nothing in effect but a temporary order of 
custody in the natural father based on the jurisdiction 
of the Juvenile Court with regard to the petition which 
the Juveni~e Court later dismissed. 
13 
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In addition, in making a temporary order ?lacin~ 
custody in the natural father before hearinf any 
evidence and without ever seeing the natural father or 
step-mother, the Court neglected to do what it was 
directed to do by the District Court in the order of 
March 21, 1975 wherein it was directed to make findings 
and an order with regard to custody. 
The Juvenile Court cannot do more nor less than the 
statute and order under which it was directed to proceed. 
When the matter was certified to the Juvenile Court with 
directions to make findings and an order with regard to 
custody and refer the matter back to the District Court 
that is precisely what the Juvenile Court should have 
done. 
By failing so to do the Juvenile Court acted 
contrary to law and the order of dismissal is invalid. 
1~ 
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POINT IV 
THERE HAS ;m WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR 
THE CIIILD AND TEE CHILD WAS ~JOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL 
AT THE HEARING DURING WHICH THE PETITIO~T WAS DISHISSED. 
A. THE CHILD'S APPOINTED COUNSEL OF RECORD WAS 
~lOT PRESE~T ON THE DATE THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS HEARD. 
The Juvenile Court may appoint, on its own motion, 
counsel to represent the child if it is necessary to 
protect the interests of the child as is observed in 
78-Ja-3:, formerly 55-10-96, U.C.A. annotated as 
amended as follows: 
. . . The Court may appoint counsel without 
such reouest if it deems representation bv counsel 
necessary to orotect the interests of the child or 
of other parties. 
Pursuant to the foregoing statute, the Court 
appointed ~~ichael Stead as attorney for the child and 
in that capacity, at the conclusion of the first day of 
trial, he opposed the mid-trial motion to dismiss 
oetitioner's amended petition as it related to the 
mental and emotional condition of the father and 
steo-mother, the threats of castration by the step-
mother and the great disparity in intelligence between 
the child and the natural father, and between the child 
and the step-mother and steo-siblin3s. 
The Cour: denied the motion to dismiss as it 
related to the aforesaid claims. 
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Michael Stead, the attorney for the child, had 
vigorously sought to bring out the issues relating 
to the mental and emotional condition of the father 
and step-mother and joined petitioner's counsel in a 
motion which resulted in an order that the child, the 
natural father and the step-mother should submit to 
psychological examinations. 
On the day set for the second day of trial, the 
Court permitted counsel for the father once again to 
renew his Motion to Dismiss and at the same time the 
Court appointed John Soltis, a Deputy County attorney, 
as guardian ad litem for the child. 
The Court at that time had not received a withdrawal 
of counsel from Michael Stead, attorney for the child, 
and the Court did not appoint John Soltis to act as 
attorney for the child. 
Since the Court had previously appointed counsel 
to represent the child, deeming it to be in the best 
interests of the child that it be represented by counsel, 
and counsel for the child was not present to protect 
the child's interests on the date the second motion to 
dismiss was heard, it was not proper to proceed to hear 
the Motion to Dismiss and the order based thereon is 
invalid. 
16 
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B. 'I'HF. APPOI~~TI1ENT OF A DEPUTY COillTTY ATTORNEY 
AS GUARDIAN AD LITE~ rOR THE CHILD WAS IMPROPER AS ACCORD-
DG TO UTAH LAW THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IS DESIGNATED 
TO REPRESE~TT THE STATE IN ANY PROCEEDINGS CONCER..~ING A 
CHILD. 
In 78-3a-35, for1T1erly 55-10-96, U.C.A. annotated 
as a~ended, it is observed as follows: 
The Court may appoint counsel without 
such request if it deems representation by 
counsel necessary to protect the interests of the 
child or of other parties. If the child and other 
parties were not represented by counsel, the Court 
shall inform them at the conclusion of the proceed-
ings that they have the right to appeal. 
The Countv Attorne the State 
in any orocee ings in a 
The language of the foregoing statute is mandatory 
as it dictates that the County Attorney shall represent 
the State in a children's case and does not give discretion 
to the Court with the use of the language employed with 
regard to appointment of counsel wherein the same statute 
states that the Court, "may appoint'' counsel to represent 
the child. 
Since the County Attorney's office is designated 
by statute to represent the State of Utah in any children's 
case, that same office cannot represent the child. 
The foregoing statute provides that if the child 
is not represented bv counsel, the Court shall infon!l the 
17 
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parties that they have a right to appeal at the conclusion 
of the proceedings and that not having been done, and the 
child not having been represented by counsel, the order 
based on the motion to dismiss the petition is invalid 
and should be vacated. 
c. THE GUA.llDIAN An LITEM DID ~mT PROPERLY REPRE-
SENT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. 
John Soltis was appointed guardian ad litem for 
the child only moments before he joined in the father's 
Second Motion to Dismiss the Petition and over the 
objection of counsel for petitioners that the appointment 
was not proper. 
While counsel of record for the child, Michael Stead, 
had been concerned about the mental and emotional well-
being of the child if the child was permitted to remain 
in the house of the natural father and wanted to hear more 
evidence concerning that portion of the petition, the 
guardian ad litem for the child, John Soltis, without 
talking to petitioner's counsel, petitioner's expert 
witnesses, the natural father or step-mother and without 
having read the independent psychological on the step-
mother, joined in the Second Motion to Dismiss. 
18 
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This partial behavior and careless action is, on 
its face, not in the best interests of the child. 
Assuming for the sake of argument, that the 
Court can appoint a Deputy County attorney as guardian 
ad litem to represent the child, rather than represent-
ing the State of Utah, all without notice to petitioner, 
and without first obtaining a withdrawal of counsel 
from the attorney of record for the child, if the 
attorney apoointed as guardian ad litem for the child 
does not act to protect the "interest of the child" 
within the meaning of 78-3a-35, formerly 55-10-96, U.C.A. 
annotated as amended, the child is substantively denied 
the assistance of counsel, and a motion made by partial 
and uninformed counsel should be vacated and set aside. 
co~rcLUSION 
The order of partial dismissal and the order 
dismissing petitioners' petition in its entirety should 
be reversed and the matter should be remanded for further 
proceedings in order that the petitioners may complete 
their case in chief, and after the case in chief is 
completed, findings should be entered and a recommendation 
~ace to the uistrict Court for a final determination on 
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the Writ of Habeas Corpus as it relates to the custody 
issue. 
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GOODWILL 
Attorney for Petitioners and 
Aopellants Ben and Janet Stowe:. 
4~~ E. 4th South, #SO 
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